Renewable Energy, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth in MENA Countries: a Panel Cointegration Approach by Saidi, Hichem et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Renewable Energy, Quality of
Institutions and Economic Growth in
MENA Countries: a Panel Cointegration
Approach
Hichem Saidi and Ghassen El Montasser and Noomen Ajmi
Ecole Supe´rieure de Commerce de Tunis
23 January 2018
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84055/
MPRA Paper No. 84055, posted 27 January 2018 16:58 UTC
1 
 
Renewable Energy, Quality of Institutions and Economic Growth in 
MENA Countries: a Panel Cointegration Approach 
 
HICHEM SAIDI 
Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Tunis, University of Manouba, Tunisia 
 
GHASSEN EL MONTASSER 

 
Quantitative Analysis Research Group 
Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Tunis, University of Manouba, Tunisia 
 
AHDI NOOMEN AJMI 
College of Science and Humanities in Slayel, Prince Sattam bin Abdulaziz University, 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we examine the relationship between renewable energy and economic 
growth taking into account institutional measures. Using panel cointegration tests, we found 
that these two variables and any institutional measure, of all considered in this study, are co-
integrated. Furthermore, we found a strong causality running from renewable energy and any 
institutional measure, except for law and order, to growth. A reverse path is also observed 
since there is also a strong causality running from growth to renewable energy when the 
causal regression includes any institutional measure. Policy implications are accordingly 
derived. 
Keywords: Cross-section dependence; Panel unit root tests; Panel cointegration tests 
JEL Classification codes: C33; Q29 
 
                                                          
 Correspondence to : GHASSEN EL MONTASSER, Quantitative Analysis Research Group, Ecole Supérieure de 
Commerce de Tunis, University of Manouba, 2010, Tunisia. E-mail: g.elmontasser@gmail.com 
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Sustainable development becomes a global challenge when issues of climate change and 
conventional energy resources reduction are considered. In this respect, promoting renewable 
energies, in particular solar and nuclear energy, represents an alternative solution which 
allows for increasing economic growth while addressing environmental issues. Emerging 
countries, being concerned with this objective, are now more and more investing in this type 
of energy resources to look for other roads for a desired level of growth while stopping 
environmental degradation. 
The MENA region is known as the leading supplier of oil and gas around the world. 
However, in recent years, these countries have been facing challenges of population growth, 
increased demand for electricity and limited investment in new generation capacity. Many 
governments in the region have thereby revised their energy policies and not long ago paid 
more attention to how to stimulate renewable energy investments. They started indeed to 
implement the regulatory reforms needed to achieve these goals. To understand the status of 
renewable energy in MENA countries, we introduce some figures reported by Asnani (2013): 
the share of renewable energy in total electricity generation in the Middle East is expected to 
increase from 2% in 2010, to 12% in 2035. Furthermore, Algeria ranks first in terms of 
electricity consumption using renewable energies in the region followed by Turkey. Their 
annual average net electricity consumption is 56.16% and 23.22%, respectively (Farhani, 
2015). Likewise, renewable energy in the region represents less than 4% of primary energy 
consumption, an average of 17% for the rest of the world. Hydropower represented an 
overwhelming source of renewable capacity, dominated by Iran, Egypt, Iraq and Morocco 
(World Energy Council,2016). As pointed by Asnani (2013), electricity generation increased 
from 260 MW in 2006 to around 1100 MW in 2012, mainly in Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. 
In addition to hydropower, this electricity generation has wind as the most common source. 
MENA countries witness a plethora of natural resources needed for a vibrant renewable 
energy sector: lots of sunshine, strong winds and, in some countries, huge rivers. 
The effect of renewable energy consumption on economic growth is a theme that has been 
abundantly explored in the literature. In particular, the causality direction between both 
variables represented an important field of research. Many studies like those of Bobinaite et 
al. (2011) Apergis and Payne (2012) Salim et al. (2014) Ohler and Fetters (2014) Hung-Pin 
(2014), Inglesi-Lotz (2016), Dogan and Seker (2016), Xu (2016) have shown that the use of 
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renewable energy is beneficial in terms of added value and pace of job creation. It allows for 
the creation of new industries with considerable commercial potential and contributes with a 
remarkable share of GDP. 
However, recent empirical and theoretical studies on the subject, for example those of Wirth 
(2014), Cifor et al. (2015), Chang and Wang (2017). Mertzanis (2018) Bhattacharya et al. 
(2017) highlighted the importance of having an adequate institutional infrastructure. Control 
of corruption, respect for democratic principles, respect for the laws and the legislative 
authority are all important elements for a policy aimed at promoting the beneficial use of 
renewable energies to succeed. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the results of various 
studies, examining the contribution of institutional quality in explaining the relationship 
between renewable energies and economic growth, are mostly mixed. This lack of consensus 
may be the consequence of the differences in the samples, the techniques used and the 
institutional variable selected. Our paper aims to contribute to this debate by considering a 
satisfactory set of institutional measures. As we have pointed out, in this paper we study the 
role of institutions in sustainable growth in the MENA region. To this aim, we make use of 
several robust panel cointegration methods in the presence of structural breaks to account for 
changes that may be identified in the studied relationships. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the literature, 
in particular the different relationships that may be detrmined between our studied variables. 
At this level,  previous studies have seldom included all of our variables. This is why our 
overview of the relevant lterature will focus on the pairwise relationships. Section 3 describes 
the data used in our study and presents the results of  the cross-section dependence tests. Our 
empirical analysis is detailed in section 4. We use here the cointegration tests of Pedroni 
(2001), Westerlund (2007) and Westerlund and Edgerton (2008). Section 5 presents our 
findings and policy implications are then presented. 
2.  Literature Review 
 
Economic growth – Renewable energy relationship: 
In the literature, many studies have examined the nexus between economic growth and 
renewable energy, without any consensus about the sense of causality between them. The 
obtained results can be classified into four types of assumptions: (i) the neutrality assumption, 
i.e. no causality relationship between economic growth and renewable energy (ii) the 
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conservation assumption maintains a unidirectional causality running from economic growth 
to renewable energy (iii) the feedback assumption claims a bidirectional relationship between 
economic growth and renewable energy (iv) the growth assumption supports a unidirectional 
causality relationship from renewable energy to economic growth. 
The feedback assumption is promoted by some recent studies. Apergis and Payne (2012) 
argue for a bidirectional causality between economic growth and renewable energy 
consumption in 80 countries examined over the 1990–2007 period. Examining OECD 
countries data covering the 1980–2011 period, Salim et al. (2014) found a short-run 
bidirectional causality relationship between GDP growth and renewable energy consumption 
using a panel cointegration method allowing for structural breaks. Ohler and Fetters (2014) 
advanced a bidirectional relationship between different forms of renewable energy and 
economic growth in OECD economies between 1990 and 2008. Lin and Moubarak (2014) 
examined China from 1977 to 2011 to study the link between renewable energy and economic 
growth by incorporating labor and CO2 emissions in the multivariate model. They found 
evidence supporting the feedback assumption. Examining a panel data of 34 OECD 
economies observed over the 1990-2010 period, Inglesi-Lotz (2016) argues for a bidirectional 
causality between renewable energy consumption and gross domestic product. Kahia et al. 
(2017a) found a long-term bidirectional causality relationship between economic growth and 
both renewable and non-renewable energy in MENA countries. 
The conservation assumption was confirmed in some other studies. Sadorsky (2009) studied 
18 emerging countries, using fully modified ordinary least squares (FM-OLS), and found that 
a 1% increase in real income per capita leads to a 3.5% increase in renewable energy 
consumption per capita. Kahia et al. (2017b) examined data of MENA Net Oil Exporting 
Countries (NOECs) over the period of 1980–2012 and found a unidirectional causality 
running from economic growth to renewable energy consumption. Ocal and Aslan (2013) 
argues for a unidirectional causality going from economic growth to renewable energy in 
Turkey during the 1990 to 2010 period. Furouka (2017) examined data on Baltic States 
covering the 1990 - 2011 period and found a unidirectional relationship running from 
economic development to renewable electricity consumption.  
On the other hand, the growth assumption was supported by a number of authors. Fang (2011) 
found that an increase in renewable energy consumption positively affects economic growth 
in China. Bowden and Payne (2010) examined the US during the 1949–2006 period and 
found a unidirectional causality running from industrial non-renewable energy use to 
economic growth using the Toda – Yamamoto causality method. In Brazil, Pao and Fu (2010) 
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found evidence about a one-way causality relationship running from total renewable energy 
use to economic growth during the 1980–2009 period. Emarah and Aykut (2017) concluded 
to the significant impact of renewable energy consumption on economic growth in Balkan and 
Black Sea Countries. Amri (2017) found that in both developing and developed countries 
renewable energy consumption leads to economic growth. A 1% increase in renewable energy 
consumption would boost economic growth by 0.873% in developed countries and by 0.678% 
in developing countries. 
As for the neutrality assumption, Dogan and Seker (2016) found no causality between 
renewable and non-renewable energy, real income, trade openness and CO2 emissions in the 
European Union over the 1980–2012 period using Dumitrescu-Hurlin causality method. 
Similarly, Yildirim et al. (2012) examined data on the United States during the 1949–2010 
period and found no relationship between different categories of renewable energy and GDP. 
Moreover, Menegaki (2011) investigated the link between renewable energy consumption and 
gross domestic product (GDP) in Europe during the 1997–2007 period. They found no 
relationship. 
Economic growth – quality of institutions relationship: 
Several economists have examined the effect of corruption on economic growth. The World 
Bank (1997, 2001) pointed out that corruption takes the form of trading official contracts for 
cash, embezzlement of public funds, and bribes paid to government officials. Farooq et al. 
(2013) reviewed the literature and pointed to some channels through which corruption reduces 
economic growth: undermining infrastructure, lowering public investment, lowering 
government revenues and reducing expenditure on health and education. 
Since the studies of Mauro (1995), Murphy et al. (1991) and Mo (2001), many authors have 
investigated how corruption impedes economic growth. Mauro (1995) argue that, other things 
being constant, one standard deviation decrease in the corruption index increases economic 
growth by 0.8%. Examining a panel of 67 countries, Mo (2001) argues that corruption has an 
inverse impact on economic growth via cash flows, volatility and political instability. 
Many studies pointed out that rich countries are less corrupt than poor nations. Examining 
African countries, Gyimah- Brenpong (2002) found that not only does corruption decrease 
economic growth but it also contributes to unequal income distribution. According to Rock 
and Bonnett (2004), corruption significantly promotes economic growth in a panel of 
countries (China, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Japan) 
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Later, Gyimah- Brenpong and Camacho (2006), studying a sample of 61 countries, found 
regional differences in the impact of growth on corruption. Examining a panel data of 41 
developing countries, Shabbir and Anwar (2007) argue that increasing globalization and 
average income have reduced corruption level. Asiedu and Freeman (2009) found a 
relationship between corruption and investment across transitional economies, and no 
relationship in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa countries. Ajilore and Elumilade 
(2007) noted that corruption is cointegrated with economic growth in Nigeria with a 
significant negative unidirectional causality from corruption to economic growth. Tsaturgan 
and Bryson (2009) examined the relationship between corruption and economic growth in 39 
countries. They concluded that corruption hinders economic performance. Ahmad and Ali 
(2010), examining a panel data of 38 countries. found that an increasing level of corruption 
impedes financial development. Similarly, Maiyaki (2010) pointed out that corruption has a 
negative effect on growth and foreign investments. Paul (2010) found a negative relationship 
between corruption and economic growth in Bangladesh. Johnson et al. (2011) argue that 
corruption negatively affects growth and investment across countries. Ugur and Dasgupta 
(2011) concluded to a negative relationship between corruption and economic growth in poor 
and high income countries. Moreover, Agostino et al. (2012) noted that corruption leads to 
lower GDP per capita growth. Studying Nigeria, Ajie and Wokekoro (2012) argue that 
corruption impedes economic growth. Studying Tunisia, Dridi (2013) found that corruption 
negatively affects economic growth in the presence of political instability. Saha and Gounder 
(2013) studied a panel data of 100 developed and developing economies and concluded that 
corruption has a negative impact on economic growth. Similarly, Shera et al. (2014) found 
that corruption has an inverse impact on economic growth. 
Therefore we can conclude that most of the above studies seem to indicate that corruption 
negatively affects economic growth. More generally and examining other institutional 
variables, Gwartney and Lawson (2004, 2007) show that sustainable and renewable energy 
investments require effective policies and public, political and regulatory support. Moreover, 
effective institutional arrangements could prevent market failures and help to maintain growth 
momentum. Wu and Broadstock (2015) studied the effect of financial development and 
institutional quality on the development of new energy infrastructure. Examining a panel of 
22 emerging countries, observed over the 1990 to 2010 period, the authors highlight the 
positive effect of financial development and institutional quality on renewable energy 
consumption. Additionally, they concluded that governments aiming to promote energy 
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infrastructure and encourage renewable energy consumption should develop a policy for a 
better coordination between financial development and targeted institutional improvement in 
new energy projects. 
Chang and Wang (2017) encourage seeting up an institutional framework that will facilitate 
the establishment of relevant laws in China and legislative proposals tracing a legal 
perspective for better development of marine renewable energies. The authors conclude that 
the Chinese government should optimize the administrative management system, strengthen 
financial regulation, such as taxation, and focus on sustainable development. 
3. Data and cross-section dependence tests 
 
Our data are annual and cover the 1986 to 2015 period. The MENA countries included in this 
study are Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt Arab Rep, Irak, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and United Arab 
Emirates. Real GDP is defined in billions of constant 2000 U.S. dollars, whereas renewable 
energy consumption is defined in millions of kilowatt hours obtained from the online World 
Bank Development Indicators. We took the Nepierian logarithms of these two variables to be 
used later in our analysis. Accordingly, Y and RE respectively denote the logarithmic 
transformations of real GDP and renewable energy consumption, respectively. On the other 
hand, institutional quality (InstQuality) is measured by five institutional variables: corruption, 
bureaucracy quality, democracy accountability, law and order and ethnic tensions. These 
institutional variables are obtained from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) and are 
kept untransformed. 
An important issue in the analysis of panel data is to take into account a possible dependency 
between countries. It is because the degree of economic and financial integration is frequently 
so high that one country may be definitely affected by economic shocks of other countries. 
This could be very intense, even typical, for the GDP variable. Renewable energy is no 
exception, nor are institutional variables. Increased convergence in renewable energy policies 
absolutely justifies the observed countries’ dependence with respect to this variable. 
Similarly, governments would establish an appropriate institutional framework that can 
explain in large part dependence between countries with respect to institutional variables. For 
this latter reason, we first test for cross-sectional dependency and country-specific 
heterogeneity. To this end, we use the bias-adjusted LM of Pesaran et al. (2008). The null 
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hypothesis of this test is no-cross section dependence (noted hereinafter adjLM ). In addition to 
Pesaran’s test, we will use two nonparametric tests: the first is that of Friedman (1937) and 
the second was introduced by Frees (1995). The null hypothesis of both tests is non-zero 
cross-sectional correlations. Frees' test is powerful in detecting false null hypotheses even 
when there is much cross-sectional dependence left out in the disturbances; see Omotor 
(2015). The critical values of this test can be obtained from Frees (2004). 
In order to test slope homogeneity, the tests noted by   and adj  and introduced by Pesaran 
and Yamagata (2008) are used; see equations (27) and (29) in Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) 
for   and  adj  tests, respectively. We also use the modified version of Swamy’s (1970) test 
proposed by Pesaran and Yamagata (2008). 
All above tests refer to the following regression: 
      (1) 
where represents the 17 MENA countries and  denotes each year 
of the 1990 to 2015 period. InstQuality refers to one of the five institutional variables 
mentioned above. Thus, in all, we have five regressions, and in each regression there is an 
output of a test among those mentioned above. 
Table 1: Tests of cross-sectional independence and slope homogeneity 
 Corruption Bureaucracy Democracy Law and 
Order 
Ethnic 
tensions 
Pesaran’s CD test 
p-value 
19.861 
0.0000 
39.722 
0.0000 
5.120 
0.0000 
10.148 
0.0000 
9.001 
0000 
Frees’ test 
Q distribution 
 
 
 
4.685 
 
0.0861 
0.1119 
0.1598 
4.178 
 
0.0861 
0.1119 
0.1598 
3.550 
 
0.0861 
0.1119 
0.1598 
3.322 
 
0.0861 
0.1119 
0.1598 
3.224 
 
0.0861 
0.1119 
0.1598 
Friedman’s test 
p-value 
127.196 
0.0000 
243.222 
0.0000 
73.662 
0.0000 
110.308 
0.0000 
109.836 
0.0000 
Sm 
pvalue 
104.3124 
0.0000 
112.1069 
0.0000 
157.1745 
0.0000 
73.8156 
0.0000 
108.8855 
0.0000 
  
pvalue 
14.9740 
0.0000 
16.3107 
0.0000 
24.0397 
0.0000 
9.7438 
0.0000 
15.7582 
0.0000 
adj  
pvalue 
15.7557 
0.0000 
17.1623 
0.0000 
25.2948 
0.0000 
10.2525 
0.0000 
16.5809 
0.0000 
Notes: The Q distribution refers to the quantiles of Frees’ test. Sm denotes the modified version suggested by 
Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) for the Swamy test. 
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Table 1 shows that the null hypothesis of no cross-section dependence and slope homogeneity 
in our panel is strongly rejected (at a significance level less than 1%). This may indicate that a 
shock occurring in one of the studied countries seems to be transmitted to other countries — 
and interdependence factors, of different types, between the cross-section units should be 
taken into account and explored in our analysis. Moreover, the rejection of slope homogeneity 
implies that the causality analysis in a panel data leads to misleading inferences by imposing a 
homogeneity restriction on the variable of interest. 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Panel unit root tests 
 
Analyzing unit roots and cointegration, the use of panel data can have the advantage of 
overcoming size and power problems associated with the use of time series. Accordingly, 
panel nonstationarity issues increasingly deserve special attention. 
To test stationarity of our data, we used a variety of panel unit root tests. In particular, we 
used the tests of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) [henceforth LLC], Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) 
[henceforth IPS]. All of these tests are considered first generation tests since they assume 
independence between the cross section-units. It may be noteworthy at this level that the IPS 
test corrected the restrictive hypothesis of the LLC test, notably the homogeneous nature of 
the autoregressive root under the alternative hypothesis. Within the heterogeneous 
specification of this root, we also considered the Maddala and Wu’s (1999) test whose 
principle is simple and uses a combination of significance levels (i.e., p-values) of the 
individual unit root tests when the N cross-sections are independent. We also used the 
Carrion-i-Silvestre, Del Barrio-Castro and López-Bazo’s (2005) test belonging to the same 
generation but with a different null hypothesis (i.e., stationarity) and by considering multiple 
structural breaks. We also have used Pesaran’s (2007) test, which is a second generation test 
since it assumes cross-section dependence. More specifically, Pesaran (2007) suggests a 
cross-sectionally augmented version of the IPS test (henceforward CIPS test), where the 
cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller statistics for the units will not be cross-sectionally 
independent because of the presence of a common factor. Finally, we used the panel 
stationarity test introduced by Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009) who considered the 
concurrent presence of multiple structural changes and common dynamic factors. 
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Table 2 : Panel unit root tests with and without cross-section dependence and structural breaks 
Variables 
Without cross section dependance                       
and structural breaks 
With cross 
section 
dependence 
and without 
structural 
breaks 
With structural 
breaks and 
without cross 
section  
dependance 
With cross-
section 
dependance and 
structural breaks 
Levin, Lin & 
Chu (2002) 
 
t-stat 
Im, Pesaran 
and Shin 
(2003) 
W-stat 
Phillips and 
Perron  
Fisher Chi-
square 
Pesaran 
(2007) CIPS* 
Carrion-i-
Silvestre and 
al.(2005) 
LM( )-test 
Bai and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2009) 
Z 
Pm 
P 
GDP -1.9504 -1.8294 62.9020*** 
 
-0.8580 
 
1.3530 
1.0113 
1.2532 
54.0789 
∆GDP -8.1471*** -8.1484*** 
 
179.0020*** 
 
- - - 
RE -1.5601* -1.7561** 42.1623 -1.0700 -4.5632 
1.2981* 
2.364*** 
57.742*** 
∆RE 
 
-7.8491*** 
 
 
-9.5931*** 
 
 
266.4290* 
 
- - - 
Corruption -2.4350*** -1.40242* 46.5513** -2.5700*** -2.1360 
0.8623 
0.9521 
53.0123 
∆Corruption 
 
-12.4034*** 
 
 
-12.1811*** 
 
 
306.3360*** 
 
- - - 
Bureaucracy 3.2696 4.8741 24.5620 -3.5960*** -2.7710 
0.7776 
0.8989 
52.2354 
∆Bureaucracy 
 
-2.1858** 
 
 
-6.4041*** 
 
 
181.7840*** 
 
 
- 
 
- - 
Democracy -2.2206** -1.3120* 30.2564 -1.8790 -3.7750 
07751 
0.8846 
51.6323 
∆Democracy 
 
-9.7828*** 
 
-7.7035*** 133.4520*** - - - 
Law -5.4175*** -4.4216*** 28.5083 -1.6540 -4.0120 
0.8444 
0.9236 
53.0001 
∆Law 
 
-11.6579*** 
 
 
-10.9130*** 
 
 
191.6090*** 
 
- - - 
Ethnic  -2.8168*** -1.5072* 44.1014** -1.9800 3.564*** 
1.7896** 
2.1239** 
56.3270* 
∆Ethnic  
 
-7.6544*** 
 
-8.7462*** 198.5270*** - - - 
Notes: ***, ** and * represent statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.The Fisher-type tests are 
computed using an asymptotic Chi-square distribution while LLC and IPS tests assume asymptotic normality. The choice of 
lag levels for the IPS test are determined by empirical realizations of the Schwarz Information Criterion. The LLC and 
Fisher-PP tests were computed using the Bartlett kernel with automatic bandwidth selection..For the test of Pesaran (2007), 
the number of common factors is set at 1. For the test of Carrion-I-Silvestre and al. (2005), the number of breaks points has 
been estimated using LWZ information criteria allowing for a maximum m = 5 structural breaks. The long-run variance is 
estimated using the Bartlett kernel with automatic spectral window bandwidth selection as in Andrews (1991). The critical 
values of Bai and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2009) test are obtained otherwise. The 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for the 
standard normal distributed Z and Pm statistics are 2.326, 1.645 and 1.282, while the critical values for the chi-squared 
distributed P statistic are 71.201, 62.830 and 58.641, respectively. The numbers of common factors are estimated using the 
panel Bayesian information criterion proposed by Bai and Ng (2002). 
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Referring to Table 2, we conclude that most of the used panel unit root tests indicate that the 
GDP variable has a unit root. However, Maddala and Wu’s (1999) test excludes this finding 
by rejecting the unit root null- hypothesis for this variable at the 1% significance level. Note 
also that the stationarity test of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) allows us to conclude that the 
GDP variable is stationary. When this variable is in first difference, all the panel unit root 
tests tend to indicate that the transformed variable is stationary. We conclude then that the 
GDP variable is order 1integrated. Similarly, most of the panel unit tests indicate that the RE 
variable is likewise order 1integrated. The behavior ofinstitutional variables is slightly 
different. In fact, the inclusion of inter-individual dependencies when we only use Pesaran’s 
CIPS statistics (2007) makes the institutional variables non-stationary, with the exception of 
Corruption and Bureaucracy that are stationary at the 1% significance level. Taking into 
account the presence of structural changes, the test of Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2005) allowed 
us to conclude to the stationarity of institutional variables with the exception of Ethnic which 
is nonstationary at the 1% significance level. However, we notice that the Ethnic variable 
becomes stationary at the 5% level when we use most of the statistics introduced by Bai and 
Carrion-i-Silvestre (2009). By and large, all variables (the institutional ones and the others) 
are non-stationary at the 5% level when we use at least two panel stationarity tests and unit 
root tests. 
Two main reasons justify our interest in structural changes. First, such breakpoints may have 
an impact on unit root tests. Second, these points will be more likely to be observed in the 
long term (see Bai and Carrion-i-Silvestre, 2009). Therefore, whether we focus on either 
series observed over a long interval or long-term relationships between variables, structural 
breaks should be considered in order to date these infrequent changes and explore the various 
economic factors behind them. The below sub-section will deal with the likely presence of 
such relationships between our variables in the panel cointegration analysis. 
4.2 Panel cointegration tests 
 
We first test if there is a long-run relationship between renewable energy, quality of 
institutions and economic growth. To do so, we consider regression (1) and use three 
cointegration tests, notably those of Pedroni (2001), Westerlund (2007) and Westerlund and 
Edgerton (2008). 
12 
 
Pedroni (1999, 2004) proposes two sets of cointegration tests: panel tests and group tests. The 
first set is based on the within dimension (i.e., panel cointegration statistics). More 
specifically, these tests yield four statistics: panel v-statistic, panel ρ-statistic, panel PP-
statistic, and panel ADF-statistic. The main feature of these statistics is that they take into 
account common time factors and heterogeneity across countries. On the other hand, the 
group tests rely on the between dimension (ie, group-mean panel cointegration statistics). 
These tests yield three statistics: group ρ-statistic, group PP-statistic, and group ADF-statistic. 
Asymptotically, all seven statistics are normally distributed. 
Westerlund (2007), using an ECM model, also introduced two types of tests: the group ones 
and the panel ones. Compared to Pedroni (1999), Westerlund (2007) takes into account cross 
sectional dependence. At this level of analysis, referring to Westerlund et al. (2015) may be 
useful in clarifying some methodological issues. The authors have indeed raised a number of 
important highlights, which we summarize as follows: (i) The rejection of the null hypothesis 
of no-cointegration, which can be achieved with Pedroni's tests, does not routinely imply that 
this hypothesis is rejected for all units, ii) the preceding point can be explained by the fact that 
these tests are robust against the alternatives that show a mix of cointegrated and non-
cointegrated units, and then, our conclusions should be drawn accordingly, iii ) The 
percentage of cointegrated units decreases as the number of regressors becomes smaller, and 
(iv) taking into account the omitted variables and the common factors, then it may be asserted 
that the panel is cointegrated as a whole. The methodological points of Westerlund et al. 
(2015) are ultimately retained by the exclusionary tendancy of the common factors observed 
in many empirical studies. In fact, several researchers falsely reached the conclusion of 
cointegration for the whole panel as they did not consider the common factors beforehand. It 
is for this reason that we will use the test introduced by Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) to 
account simultaneously for common factors and structural changes given that such breaks are 
highly likely to occur in long horizons as mentioned above.  
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Table3: Panel Co-integration results of Pedroni’s (2004) tests 
 
Corruption Bureaucracy Democracy Law and order Ethnic 
P
an
el
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
Variance 
ratio -1.4677 -0.8344 -3.3800 -0.5827 -0.1327 
Rho stat 
2.2070 2.1895 2.1577 0.8689 0.3302 
PP stat 
0.9826 1.5587 1.3391 -1.6056* -2.1613** 
ADF stat 
-1.2289 -0.6890 0.6045 -2.7287** -4.8102*** 
G
ro
u
p
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s 
- 
- - - - - 
Rho stat 
2.7723 3.4390 2.9804 1.4080 1.7420 
PP stat 
0.07565 1.4557 0.0609 -2.7437*** -3.7337*** 
ADF stat 
-2.7437*** -2.0635** -1.9291** -4.6917*** -5.9074*** 
 Notes: Pedroni's statistics are asymptotically distributed as standard normal. The variance ratio test is right-sided, while the 
other Pedroni tests are left-sided. ***,** and * indicates the rejection of the null of no cointegration at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels,  respectively.  
 
Table 3 displays the results reported by Pedroni’s (2004) tests for the five regressions shown 
by eq. (1). Clearly, we deduce there is some evidence of cointegration between GDP, 
renewable energy and institutional quality measured by the five institutional variables: 
corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, law and order and Ethnic. More specifically, for each 
institutional variable, there is at least one test of the seven tests of Pedroni (2004) which 
rejects the null hypothesis of no-cointegration at the 5% and 1% significance levels. 
Table 4: Error-Correction Panel Cointegration results 
Of Westerlund (2007) tests 
Statistics+ 
Corruption Bureaucracy Democracy Law and order Ethnic 
Value  P-
value 
Value  P-
value 
Value  P-
value 
Value  P-
value 
Value  P-
value 
G
ro
u
p
-m
ea
n
 
st
a
ti
st
ic
s 
Gt 
-2.519 0.518 -0.911 0.968 -0.942 0.958 -2.039 0.992 0.014 1.000 
Ga 
-5.332 1.000 -0.640 1.000 -0.610 1.000 -5.346 1.000 -1.662 0.999 
P
a
n
el
 s
ta
ti
st
ic
s Pt -
14.13*** 
0.000 -4.300 0.371 -4.993 0.198 
-
18.43*** 
0.000 -2.310 0.879 
Pa -
16.52*** 
0.000 -1.645 0.764 -1.634 0.767 
-
20.767** 
0.000 -0.455 0.957 
Notes : ** and *** indicate the rejection of the null at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.The p-values are 
based on the normal distribution; The average AIC selected lag lengths are 2.47, 1.35, 1.47, 1.88 and 1.24 
respectively  and the average AIC selected lead lengths are 0.82, 0.71, 1.41, 0.65 and 0.47 respectively.
 
The 
statistics ara calculated with deterministic terms included in the error correction model are only a constand and 
a trend.  
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In table 4, the null hypothesis of no cointegration in the error correction model is rejected only 
for the regressions estimating the institutional variables of corruption and law and order (with 
the panels statistics Pt and Pa reject the nullhypothesis for both variables at the 1% level) 
while the group-mean statistics as a whole (Gt and Ga) accept the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration in the five regressions. 
As a second step, we apply the panel cointegration LM-based tests proposed by Westerlund 
and Edgerton (2008). These tests simultaneously consider cross-section dependence and 
structural breaks. The use of such tests is all the more justified because the MENA countries 
have pursued a policy of economic liberalization and have tried to build strong economic 
relationships between them since the 1990s. This type of economic policy makes the MENA 
countries likely vulnerable to the same set of internal and external factors affecting the 
evolution of their economies. The above-mentioned assumptions justify the cross-section 
dependence hypothesis. On the other hand, since 1990the MENA countries have seen 
structural changes persisitent in the same years or close years. This can be interpreted by 
some notable events in the international scene (1990 Gulf War and the recurrence of financial 
crises...). In addition, during our study period 1990-2015, the MENA countries have 
experienced structural changes mainly due to new reforms to benefit further from renewable 
energy. These LM-based tests allow for heteroskedastic and serially correlated errors, and 
cross unit-specific time trends. In Table 5, both test statistics Zφ(N) and Zτ(N) of Westerlund 
and Edgerton (2008) yield evidence in favour of a long-run relationship between GDP, 
renewable energy and institutional quality. These mixed conclusions drawn from the tests of 
Westerlund (2007) and those of Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) may be interpreted by the 
fact that the former did not take into account breakpoints. In other words, the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration is under-rejected when there are structural changes affecting the 
cointegrating relationships (see Haug et al., 2011). 
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Table 5: The Westerlund and Edgerton (2008) Panel Co-integration tests with cross-
section dependence and structural breaks of  
 Corruption Bureaucracy Democracy Law and order Ethnic 
Model 
 NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ   NZ  
No break 
 
-5.22*** -1.54*** -5.28*** -1.55*** -2.223** -3.071** -1.506* -1.302* -1.666* -0.489 
Mean shift 
 
-2.11** -1.43* -2.09** -1.33* -5.31*** -2.51*** -0.320 -0.488 -0.430 -0.321 
Regime shift 
 
-2.31*** -1.72*** -2.28*** -1.75*** -0.255 -1.404* -0.885 -0.772 -0.350 -0.299 
Notes: These tests use the Campbell and Perron (1991) automatic procedure to select the lag length. We use three breaks, 
which are determined by grid search at the minimum of the sum of squared residuals. The P-values are for a one-sided test 
based on the normal distribution. The LM-based test statistics  NZ and  NZ are normal distributed. The number of 
common factors is determined by means of the information criterion proposed by Bai and Ng (2004) and the maximum 
number is set to 5. ***, **, and *  indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Overall, there is fair evidence that our variables are order 1 integrated and are cointegrated. 
Next, we use two techniques to estimate the long-term relationship already specified in (1): 
The Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) and the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares 
(DOLS). The results are shown in Table 6. We conclude that all the coefficients of the 
institutional variables are significant except for bureaucracy. Likewise, renewable energy has 
a significant effect on growth. 
Table 6: Panel long run estimations (Dependent variable; GDP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS FMOLS DOLS 
RE 0.2059** 
(2.461) 
0.1828** 
(2.1097 
0.1626** 
(2.131) 
0.1714* 
(1.872) 
0.1601** 
(0.033) 
0.1600* 
(1.943) 
0.1720** 
(2.129) 
0.1448* 
1.778) 
0.1579** 
(2.553) 
0.1228* 
(1.758) 
Corruption -0.201** 
(-2.453) 
-2.230** 
(-2.573) 
        
Bureaucracy   2.1417 
(0.434) 
5.3217 
(0.981) 
      
Democracy     -0.237** 
(-2.139) 
-0.1715 
(-1.414) 
    
Law and order       0.2348 
(1.367) 
0.3274* 
(1.812) 
  
Ethnic         0.6043*** 
(9.291) 
0.5934*** 
(8.197) 
***,** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and  10% levels, respectively. (1) Relative regression of 
corruption, (2) Relative regression of bureaucracy, (3) Relative regression of democracy, (4) Relative regression of Law and 
order and (5) Relative regression of Ethnic. 
4.3 Panel error correction model 
 
Using the two- step procedure of Engle and Granger (1987), we consider the following panel 
(vector) error correction model: 
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  (2) 
  (3) 
    (4) 
where EC denotes the error correction term (ECT) and  refers to one of the five 
institutional variables. There is no widespread agreement on the maximum number of the 
lagged terms in (1), (2) and (3), but as recommended by Westerlund (2007), we will consider 
the maximum lag length as being equal to 4(Int(T/ 100))
2/9
, where Int(x) denotes the integer 
part of x and T is the number of years covered by this study. Having fixed the maximum lag 
length, the optimal number of lagged terms included by the ECM models is then determined 
by the Schwarz information criterion (SIC). The above models highlight the long-term 
relationship and short-run adjustment mechanisms towards equilibrium. Moreover, with such 
models, one can carry out causality tests. We will indeed consider three types of causality: 
long-run causality, strong causality and short-run causality. To estimate these three types, we 
take, by way of illustration, the ECM model (1): the corresponding null hypothesis of no long-
run causality running from RE and the considered institutional variable to GDP is H0: , 
while the null hypothesis of no short-run causality running from RE to GDP can be 
formulated as H0: . Likewise, this null hypothesis can be 
extended and becomes H0: =  to 
test if there is a short-run causality running from jointly RE and the considered institutional 
variable to GDP. Finally, the null hypothesis of no strong causality running from RE to GDP 
is H0: . This null hypothesis can be duly extended 
accordingly in the same manner as the above test. We prefer to perform these tests only for 
the ECM models (2) and (3) because the underlying interpretations are more interesting than 
those that could be drawn if we apply these tests to the ECM model (4). As pointed by Brooks 
(2008), while the usual t- and F-statistics have satisfactory properties in the context of 
nonlinear estimation, their drawback is, however, the lack of some requested flexibility. This 
is why we add the Wald statistics. Table 7 shows that there is a long-term causality running 
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from GDP and any considered institutional quality variable to RE. Likewise, this long-term 
causality is always supported by reversing the path, i.e. from RE, and any considered 
institutional measure to GDP. The long-term relationship between GDP and RE has actually 
been noted, quite remarkably, in the literature (see for example Apergis and Danuletiu, 2014 
and Rafindadi and Ozturk, 2017). However, in studies focusing on the relationship between 
both variables, there is a tendency to omit the role of institutional quality measures whose 
effects on both of them will be uncovered in the long run. Subsequently, Tables 8 and 9 reveal 
no short-run causality running from institutional variables to either renewable energy or 
growth. The exception is the short-run causalities running from corruption to growth and 
order and law to growth as shown in Table 8. The first causality has been widely mentioned in 
the literature where corruption has been shown to have short-term effects on growth (see, 
inter alia, Farooq et al., 2013) . However, the second causality may indicate that law and 
order can sometimes have immediate effects on some sectors of the economy such as 
agriculture as pointed out by Dam (2006). On the other hand, non respect of law and failure to 
comply with order can have remarkable harmful consequences on growth in the short term. 
We may recall here some disruptive events that took place in some MENA countries in 2011. 
In Table 10, we notice that renewable energy does not cause growth in both the short and long 
term when the corresponding regression does integrate the law and order variable. This is true 
again when testing whether there is a strong causality going from both law and order and 
renewable energy to growth. This finding can be explained by the fact that non-compliance 
with law and low renewable energy investment legislation may dampen the expected positive 
effect of the RE variable on economic growth. While this seems to be a too negative 
statement, encouraging thus several companies to invest in renewable energies in this region, 
it does reveal a positive signal on the future role played by these energies in achieving 
sustainable development in these countries. Significant causalities running from each 
institutional variable to growth make this optimism all the more heightened. 
Table 11 gives new insights into the relationship between the studied variables unlike the 
findings in the previous table. Now economic growth causes  renewable energy in both the 
long and short run regardless of the institutional variable included in the basic causal 
regression. Similarly and just like in the previous table, each institutional variable ‘strongly’ 
causes the dependent variable, which is economic growth here. Finally, growth joint to any 
institutional variable ‘strongly’ causes renewable energy. This shows once again the need to 
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invest in renewable energy for this latter to play its role. Satisfactory economic growth and 
the establishment of a performing institutional framework are the conditions to lay down. 
Table 7: Long-run causality results 
Inst. 
Dep. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
F-stat. Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. Wald 
stat. 
GDP 19.7726 
(0.0000) 
19.7726 
(0.0000) 
 
9.17119 
(0.0026) 
9.17119 
(0.0025) 
8.0588 
(0.0047) 
8.0588 
(0.0045) 
5.5957 
(0.0185) 
5.5957 
(0.0180) 
15.617 
(0.0001) 
15.617 
(0.0001) 
RE 99.551 
(0.0000) 
99.5518 
(0.0000) 
 
94.8492 
(0.0000) 
94.8492 
(0.0000) 
99.6427 
(0.0000) 
99.6427 
(0.0000) 
97.0737 
(0.0000) 
97.0737 
(0.0000) 
93.4549 
(0.0000) 
93.4549 
(0.0000) 
Notes: The numbers that fill the boxes are the values of F- and Wald statistics and those in parentheses are their 
corresponding p-values. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) denote the ECM models including corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, law 
and order and ethnic, respectively. 
Table 8: Short-run causality results, GDP is the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat 
Wald 
stat. 
RE  0.5976 
(0.616) 
1.7927 
(0.616) 
0.7482 
(0.523) 
2.2446 
(0.523) 
0.6913 
(0.557) 
2.0739 
(0.557) 
0.7157 
(0.543) 
2.1472 
(0.542) 
0.7154 
(0.543) 
2.1462 
(0.542) 
Corr  Y 2.3313 
(0.073) 
6.994 
(0.072) 
- - - - - - - - 
RE,Corr  Y 0.3094 
(0.932) 
1.8564 
(0.932) 
- - - - - - - - 
Bur  
- - 
0.0344 
(0.991) 
0.1031 
(0.991) 
- - - - - - 
RE,Bur Y 
- - 
0.3987 
(0.879) 
2.3921 
(0.880) 
- - - - - - 
Dem Y 
- - - - 
0.2657 
(0.850) 
0.7972 
(0.850) 
- - - - 
RE,Dem  Y 
- - - - 
0.4732 
(0.828) 
2.8394 
(0.828) 
- - - - 
Law-order  Y 
- - - - - - 
2.7421 
(0.042) 
8.2265 
(0.041) 
- - 
RE, Law-order Y 
- - - - - - 
0.6166 
(0.717) 
3.6998 
(0.717) 
- - 
Eth Y 
- - - - - - - - 
0.0307 
(0.992) 
0.0920 
(0.992) 
RE, Eth  Y 
- - - - - - - - 
0.3958 
(0.881) 
2.3746 
(0.882) 
Notes: The numbers that fill the boxes are the values of F- and Wald statistics and those in parentheses are their 
corresponding p-values. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) denote the ECM models including corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, law 
and order and ethnics, respectively. The arrow indicates the direction of causality. 
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Table 9: Short-run causality results, RE  is the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat 
Wald 
stat. 
Y  
0.0061 
(0.999) 
0.0182 
(0.999) 
0.0109 
(0.998) 
0.0326 
(0.998) 
0.0187 
(0.996) 
0.0560 
(0.996) 
0.0265 
(0.994) 
0.0796 
(0.994) 
0.0109 
(0.998) 
0.0328 
(0.998) 
Corr  RE 
1.5692 
(0.196) 
4.7078 
(0.194) 
- - - - - - - - 
Y,Corr  RE 
0.7877 
(0.579) 
4.7261 
(0.579) 
- - - - - - - - 
Bur  - - 
0.0007 
(1.000) 
0.0020 
(1.000) 
- - - - - - 
Y,Bur RE - - 
0.0058 
(1.0000) 
0.0348 
(1.0000) 
- - - - - - 
Dem RE - - - - 
0.1165 
(0.950) 
0.3496 
(0.950) 
- - - - 
Y,Dem  RE - - - - 
0.0675 
(0.998) 
0.4051 
(0.998) 
- - - - 
Law-order  RE - - - - - - 
2.7414 
(0.042) 
8.2241 
(0.041) 
- - 
Y, Law-order RE - - - - - - 
1.3853 
(0.218) 
8.3119 
(0.216) 
- - 
Eth RE - - - - - - - - 
0.0131 
(0.997) 
0.0394 
(0.997) 
Y, Eth  RE - - - - - - - - 
0.012 
(1.000) 
0.0718 
(1.000) 
Notes: The numbers that fill the boxes are the values of F- and Wald statistics and those in parentheses are their 
corresponding p-values. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) denote the ECM models including corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, law 
and order and ethnic, respectively. The arrow indicates the direction of causality. 
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Table 10: Strong causality results, GDP is the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 F-stat. Wald stat. F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat 
Wald 
stat. 
ECT,RE  Y 
5.5635 
(0.000) 
22.254 
(0.000) 
2.5688 
(0.037) 
10.275 
(0.036) 
2.2790 
(0.060) 
9.1161 
(0.058) 
0.9944 
(0.410) 
3.9777 
(0.409) 
4.3059 
(0.002) 
17.223 
(0.001) 
ECT,Corr  Y 
4.9939 
(0.0006) 
19.9757 
(0.0005) 
- - - - - - - - 
ECT,RE,Corr  Y 
3.1997 
(0.0026) 
22.3981 
(0.0022) 
- - - - - - - - 
ECT,Bur  - - 
2.3736 
(0.051) 
9.4944 
(0.049) 
- - - - - - 
ECT,RE,Bur Y - - 
0.5110 
(0.082) 
3.5772 
(0.082) 
- - - - - - 
ECT,Dem Y - - - - 
2.0932 
(0.080) 
8.3729 
(0.078) 
- - - - 
ECT,RE,Dem  Y - - - - 
0.8215 
(0.056) 
5.7503 
(0.056) 
- - - - 
ECT,Law-order  Y - - - - - - 
4.2662 
(0.002) 
17.064 
(0.001) 
- - 
ECT,RE,Law-order Y - - - - - - 
0.7935 
(0.593) 
5.5543 
(0.592) 
- - 
ECT,Eth Y - - - - - - - - 
4.2798 
(0.002) 
17.119 
(0.001) 
ECT,RE, Eth  Y - - - - - - - - 
2.5996 
(0.012) 
18.197 
(0.011) 
Notes: The numbers that fill the boxes are the values of F- and Wald statistics and those in parentheses are their 
corresponding p-values. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) denote the ECM models including corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, law 
and order and ethnic, respectively. The arrow indicates the direction of causality, and ECT denotes the error correction 
term. 
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Table 11: Strong causality results, RE  is the dependent variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. Wald stat. F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat. 
Wald 
stat. 
F-stat 
Wald 
stat. 
ECT,Y RE N/A N/A 
23.712 
(0.000) 
94.849 
(0.000) 
24.910 
(0.000) 
99.642 
(0.000) 
24.268 
(0.000) 
 97.073 
(0.000) 
 23.363 
(0.000) 
93.454 
(0.000) 
ECT,Corr  RE 
26.536 
(0.000) 
106.14 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - - - 
ECT,Y,Corr  RE 
15.163 
(0.000) 
106.14 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - - - 
ECT,Bur  RE - - 
23.712 
(0.000) 
94.849 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - 
ECT,Y,Bur RE - - 
13.549 
(0.000) 
94.849 
(0.000) 
- - - - - - 
ECT,Dem RE - - - - 
24.913 
(0.000) 
99.652 
(0.000) 
- - - - 
ECT,Y,Dem  RE - - - - 
14.236 
(0.000) 
99.652 
(0.000) 
- - - - 
ECT,Law-order  RE - - - - - - 
27.121 
(0.000) 
108.48 
(0.000) 
- - 
ECT,Y,Law-order RE - - - - - - 
15.497 
(0.000) 
108.48 
(0.000) 
- - 
ECT,Eth RE - - - - - - - - 
23.611 
(0.000) 
94.446 
(0.000) 
ECT,Y, Eth  RE - - - - - - - - 
13.492 
(0.000) 
94.446 
(0.000) 
Notes: The numbers that fill the boxes are the values of F- and Wald statistics and those in parentheses are their 
corresponding p-values. (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5) denote the ECM models including corruption, bureaucracy, democracy, law 
and order and ethnic, respectively. The arrow indicates the direction of causality, ECT denotes the error correction term, 
and N/A refers to non-applicable calculations. 
5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
 
The role of renewable energy is not only about reducing CO2 emissions nationally and 
globally, but also about supplying new resources that can help to achieve sustainable 
development. Wilkins (2002) puts forward the view that renewable energy should be part and 
parcel of sustainable development strategies, a strategy for poverty reduction and any other 
development plan and target. For this reason, studying the relationship between renewable 
energy and growth is needed to see if these goals have been achieved or will be achieved.  
Our paper examined this relationship while also considering institutional measures. To this 
end, we used the panel cointegration tests of Pedroni (1999, 2004), Westerlund (2007) and 
Westerlund and Edgerton (2008). Our main results can be summarized as follows. First, 
renewable energy, growth, and any institutional variable of the five studied are cointegrated. 
Second, by estimating the coefficients of the long-term relationships with the FMOLS and 
DOLS techniques, we found that renewable energy has a significant positive impact on 
growth. Likewise, all institutional measures, with the exception of bureaucracy, have a 
significant impact on growth. Third, we found a long-run causality running from GDP and 
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any institutional quality measure taken into account to RE. By reversing the path, i.e. from  
RE and any considered institutional measure to GDP, the corresponding long-run causality is 
undoubtedly noted. Fourth, each institutional measure strongly causes RE and GDP. Fifth, RE 
strongly causes GDP when the corresponding causal regression integrates all exceptional 
variables except for law and order.  Sixth, economic growth causes renewable energies in 
both the short and long term, regardless of the institutional variable included in the basic 
causal regression.  
Through this study, we revealed that the beneficial effects of renewable energy on growth 
require the establishment of adequate institutional arrangements. In other words, countries 
seeking to increase their economic growth must have a sound institutional and legal 
frameworks that allow them to take advantage of the benefits of renewable energy use. In this 
context, we studied a sample of MENA countries that have experienced remarkable growth 
after initiating economic reforms--perhaps the most important one is portrayed by making 
recourse to renewable energy as an alternative to the shortage in other energies. On the other 
hand, these countries are known by weak institutions, lack of transparency, a corrupt 
environment and a decrease in the law index. As such, investment in renewable energy has 
not so far enabled these countries to benefit from their economic growth. As a result, 
government authorities in MENA countries should imperatively improve institutional quality 
in order to succeed in energy sector reforms and generate the greatest benefits from growth in 
which renewable energy will be one of its key determinants. 
There are other facets to this topic which may be future lines of research. Of these, we 
mention the relationship between renewable energy with some macroeconomic aggregates by 
sectors such as industrial and agricultural production or their corresponding added values. In 
this respect, we can grant a special interest in this type of relationships while expanding the 
set of institutional measures since some of them have not been taken into account in our 
paper. Developed countries enjoy a reservoir of renewable energy profits undreamed of by the 
rest of the world wanting to invest in this sector. Inherent technology transfer could be an 
appealing issue therefore. Along with these theoretical questions, we can consider a nonlinear 
panel ECM as the literature insists that these macroeconomic aggregates are rather non-linear. 
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